Every signal
has a story.
Trace the credential. Challenge the trust boundary. Prove what the evidence can—and cannot—establish.
Two real targets. No invented results.
Start by identifying the IHG card, then document legitimate door behavior and obtain authorized vendor audit evidence.
Keep observation separate from interpretation.
The signal
workbench.
Tag discovery, reader-reported identity evidence, and controlled benign duplication. Every result is graded by what was actually measured.
Choose a test device
Select a device. Use Chrome on Android with NFC enabled.
Device responded without a reader-reported identifier. This cannot prove the selected card was the source.
Hardware fingerprint
For chips unsupported by Web NFC, enter the public technology from NFC Tools READ.
Import existing scan
Bring your existing four-card JSON back into the analysis. Not a new live hardware scan.
IHG hotel-card fingerprint
Record public NFC technology and NDEF record types from the card you legitimately hold. This is separate from the four blank test devices. No payloads, serial values, protected sectors or hotel access secrets are retained.
Use Chrome on Android. Scan only the legitimate card you hold, with no hotel identifiers recorded.
An active hotel access credential is NOT a cloning target. If Web NFC cannot read its NDEF, record the chip family from NFC Tools READ without accessing protected data.
Controlled content replication
Write an identical, harmless demonstration message to each confirmed blank white card. This tests application-message copying—not credential cloning.
CPX-GHOSTKEY-LAB-NONACCESS-2026-10-31Only blank owned white cards. Never use a live hotel credential.
Adversary
simulation.
Challenge security assumptions using reproducible threat fixtures. Run each scenario individually or execute the full battery. No real lock is contacted.
No simulations run. No physical lock connected.
Read the trail.
Question the trail.
Cross-correlate authorization, revocation, and access anomalies. Lock event history must come from an authorized vendor export; the phone cannot extract it by tapping a door.
Reader system
Source verification
Import a permissioned, anonymized event file—or run the clearly labeled synthetic dataset.
No verified door audit events are connected.
Document the door, not an invented exploit
Record a normal entry attempt to your assigned room using your legitimately issued hotel card. Do not try blank cards, the blue fob, copied keys, or unauthorized doors.
No physical access observation logged. A normal door response is not a vendor-authenticated audit event.
Audit anomalies
Trust nothing.
Verify every gate.
Protect privileged access with a verified password, a USB FIDO2 key, and a second cryptographic NFC authenticator—then monitor anomalous activity and protect encrypted recovery copies. This is a policy simulation; no production session can be issued here.
Verified password
Argon2id/PBKDF2 policy at server verifier. No password entered or stored here.
SERVER VERIFIED ONLYFIDO2 security key
Origin-bound WebAuthn, challenge signature, and hardware user verification.
CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROOFIndependent NFC key
Second separately enrolled FIDO2 authenticator for privileged actions.
NO UID / CLASSIC AUTHTransaction gate
Fresh signed challenge, verified origin, risk decision, and bounded session.
DENY ON INCOMPLETE PROOFRun an authentication decision
The simulation generates synthetic server-backed proofs. It does not unlock an account, enroll an authenticator, or send a password to the browser.
Check your device environment
Detect browser API support without triggering enrollment or revealing credential data. This is not proof that any hardware key is connected.
Not checked. A browser that supports WebAuthn still needs registered FIDO2 hardware and a server verifier.
SESSION RESPONSEContainment design
A browser cannot monitor all device traffic. Live telemetry requires an endpoint agent, authenticated gateway/WAF events, and server-side anomaly detection.
Backup without exposing the keys.
Keep password-vault ciphertext on an encrypted USB volume and in remote storage, with independent offline recovery material. Do not put plaintext passwords, recovery codes, or master keys onto NFC tags or this page.
Unverified design checklist. GHOSTkey does not currently encrypt, upload, restore, or inspect your password vault.
Evidence over
assumption.
Independent observed facts, simulated threat fixtures, audit gaps, and defensible recommendations. Never claim a working attack from absent evidence.